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Abstract 
This paper finds club convergence within the 50 U.S. states using Phillips and Sul’s (2007, 
2009) regression-based convergence test using per capita real state domestic product from 1997 
to 2017. Two clubs with diverging transition paths are found. Clubs 1 and 2 mimics the divide 
that is seen in the flow of funds from the federal government to the states (DiNapoli 2017, 
2018). Hence, the log t test of Phillips and Sul (2007) is telling the tale of there being two 
Americas if all factors remain the same, but this need not be the case with the proper policy 
prescription.  
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1. Introduction 
The neoclassical growth model predicts that relatively poorer economies will grow 
faster than relatively richer ones has been applied to countries, but now, modern growth 
theories have also been focusing on the growth of regions, which extends Solow’s (1956) 
ground-breaking work.  Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) have suggested that the distribution 
of per capita income in regions may point towards a tendency to cluster around a small number 
of poles of attraction, instead of “overall convergence.” In addition, modifications to the 
original neoclassical model have been proposed by replacing homogeneous technological 
progress across countries in the neoclassical production function with the assumption of 
country-specific, technological growth rates (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1997, Howitt and Mayer-
Foulkes 2005). In a similar manner, Galor (1996) shows that the neoclassical growth model 
can actually generate multiple equilibria. So, countries with identical economic structures need 
not converge to the same equilibrium growth path, but instead may converge to a high steady-
state income level while others may face a poverty trap, giving rise to the “club convergence” 
hypothesis. Hence, the club convergence hypothesis permits the possibility of multiple locally, 
stable steady-states (Durlauf and Johnson 1995). 
The notion of regional convergence that allows for multiple stable equilibria is applied 
to the fifty states of the U.S. in this paper. In particular, this work seeks to investigate the 
evolution of convergence between states in the U.S. from 1997 to 2017.   
The 50 states are diverse in terms of geography, size, population, and economy. The 
U.S. has a tradition of state’s rights, meaning that rights not mandated to the federal 
government are given to the states, which gives states a degree of autonomy.  This paper seeks 
to determine the level convergence within the 50 U.S. states using a regression based 
convergence test that has been developed by Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009), which is referred 
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to as the log t test. The Phillips and Sul regression based convergence test (2007, 2009), i.e. 
the log t test is to be referred to as PS henceforth.  
The log t test is based on the cross-sectional variance ratio of per capita income over 
time. Durlauf and Johnson (2006) notes the utility of the econometric tools developed by 
Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) in capturing the transitional dynamics of output that processes 
towards steady states. 
Regarding the application of the PS (2007, 2009) log t test to U.S. data, there has 
not been a great deal of research. Apergis and Payne (2012) and Kim and Rous (2012) 
examine convergence in U.S. house prices using the housing price index. More recently, 
Choi and Wang (2015) applying the PS method to real output per worker for the 48 
continental states of the U.S. and they find that states have not fully converged over the last 
five decades (1963-2011). Their clustering algorithm reveals the convergence of four 
distinct subgroups of states with respect to productivity.  
Furthermore, Apergis, Christou, Gupta, and Miller (2018) have used the PS model to 
test for the convergence of different inequality measures (the share of total income held by 
the top 10% of the income distribution and the Gini coefficient) across states in the U.S. 
from 1916 to 2012, which includes a series of different periods such as the Great Depression 
(1929–1944), the Great Compression (1945–1979), the Great Divergence (1980-present), 
the Great Moderation (1982–2007), and the Great Recession (2007–2009).  
In their seminal paper, Phillips and Sul (2007) use their methodology to examine the 
cost of living for 19 metropolitan areas in the U.S. In their follow-up paper, Phillips and Sul 
(2009) examine 8 Western OECD countries from 1500 to 2001, 152 countries from 1970 
to 2003, and 98 countries from 1960 to 2003. Phillips and Sul (2009) further breaks down 
relative convergence into club convergence for the countries but not for the U.S.  
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 As it pertains to the U.S., Phillips and Sul (2009) examine log per capita real income 
for all 48 contiguous states from 1929 to 1998.  Phillips and Sul (2009) find there to be a 
common transition behavior for all 48 contiguous states, which indicates growth 
convergence and there being heterogeneity across states. For all 48 contiguous states, PS 
(2009) find there to be relative convergence.  
This paper extends the work of Phillips and Sul (2009) with respect to per capita real 
state domestic product (SDP) for club convergence for all 50 states of the U.S.  using panel 
data from 1997 to 2017 by finding two diverging transition paths.  
The type of convergence a country or region experiences has important policy 
implications.  Using the definitions of convergence by Galor (1996), the Absolute 
Convergence Hypothesis, which is also known as σ-convergence, refers to the 
countries/states converging to the same steady-state level of output per capita since they 
have the same characteristics such as preference, technology and market structure, but the 
initial conditions could be different (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992).  The Conditional 
Convergence Hypothesis, which is also known as β-convergence, refers to countries/sates 
having the possibility of different initial conditions with respect to physical and human 
capital, so they converge to their own steady state even though they have similar structural 
characteristics (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992). Club Convergence can be seen as a subset 
of Conditional Convergence.  The Club Convergence Hypothesis refers to countries/state 
having identical structural characteristics but with different initial levels of human and 
physical capital clustering around different steady-state equilibria (Galor 1996). Hence, this 
could create multiple equilibria.  
According to Galor (1996), if there is conditional convergence, the policy remedy 
is to provide aid that focuses on improving the structure of the economy such as 
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infrastructure, technological preferences, population growth, education, financial systems, 
government policy, factor market structure, etc. 
Regarding Club Convergence, low SDP per capita could also have low economic 
growth rates. So, the policy implications are to include income transfers from the richer 
clubs to the poorer clubs because income does indeed matter for economic growth. The 
income transfers to the poorer clubs are done with the intent of changing the structural 
characteristics and initial conditions.  
Some works, where the result of the number of clubs has been four or more, have 
empirically demonstrated that both the initial conditions and the structural characteristics, 
have been predominantly driven by technology and human capital (Bartkowska and Riedl 
2012, Choi and Wang 2015, Von Lyncker and Thoennessen 2017). This is consistent with 
the prevailing view in the theoretical economic growth literature. 
The PS test (2007) rejects absolute convergence in the U.S. at the 95% significance 
level but it does find club convergence.  Specifically, according to the PS log t test (2007), the 
U.S. is divided into two growth clubs. Club 1 is the higher growth club that contains 28 states, 
which is diverging from Club 2, the lower growth club. Club 2 contain 22 states.  
Clubs 1 and 2 mimics the divide that is seen in the flow of funds from the federal 
government to the states (DiNapoli 2017, 2018). The vast majority of the states that run a 
deficit, meaning they receive less from the federal government than they give, are in Club 1,  
which the club with the higher steady state. There are states that have a surplus meaning they 
get back more from the federal government than they give are in Club 1. It should be noted that 
a surplus amounts to an income transfer.  It seems that the spending done by these states are 
ensuring long rung growth.   
The PS log t test developed by is also able to identify clubs that are on the verge of 
switching clubs, which has important policy implications. So, the nine at-risk states in Club 1 
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have the potential of losing their high growth and becoming part of Club 2.  Alternately, there 
are 10 states in Club 2 that have the potential of switching to the high growth club. Hence, the 
findings of the PS test (2007) can be used to identify states that are in need of improving the 
structure of the economy in order to promote long term growth (Galor 1996). 
Furthermore, in order to further test membership in each club, the differences in 
means between clubs is analysed using the balance of payments in per capita terms, the 
growth rate of research and development (R&D) as a percentage of SDP, growth in the 
number of patents, population growth, and the percentage of people with bachelor’s degrees 
in Science or Engineering. Using the afore-mentioned technological and human capital 
variables, a logit regression is used to show the probability of belonging to Club 1.  
 The structure of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the 
methodology; Section 3 presents the data and the empirical results; and Section 4 concludes.  
2.  Methodology 
 The PS convergence test (2007, 2009) is a non-linear factor model that is able to use 
stationary or non-stationary data while being able to capture absolute, conditional, or club 
convergence as well as transitional heterogeneity.  It is also able to overcome the omitted 
variable bias.  
 In addition, it endogenously identifies regions/states with similar structural 
characteristics but with different initial conditions, which helps to identify convergence 
clusters, and this is useful in examining transitional behaviour (Aksoy, Taştan, and Kama 
2019). The test is a regression that can also provide a grouping, which does not depend on 
eventual assumptions about the stationary trend of the examined variables (Monfort, Cuestas, 
and Ordóñez, 2013). 
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PS (2007) propose using a nonlinear, time-varying, factor model for testing the 
convergence hypothesis and the identification of convergence clubs. The variable of interest is 
per capita real SDP for all 50 states of the U.S., which is denoted as Xit where i = {1, …, N} 
and t = {1, …, T} with N refers to the total number of states, which is 50 and t ranging from 
1997 to 2017. Hence, the PS model (2007, 2009) introduces a cross-sectional analysis as well 
as a heterogeneous time series analysis in the parameters of a neoclassical growth model in 
order to form the data panel {𝑋𝑖𝑡}. 
 In practice, the natural log of Xit, which is Ln(Xit) is used and is decomposed into two 
components: 
Ln(Xit)≈𝜑iμt,          (1) 
where 𝜑i is the component containing the idiosyncratic factors of each state while 𝜇𝑡 represents 
the common stochastic trends.  
To take into account the heterogeneity of a temporary transition variable, hit, is 
analyzed. In this formulation, the factor loading portion, 𝜑i measures the distance between Xit 
and common factor 𝜇𝑡. 
Given the data panel {𝑋𝑖𝑡}, the following steps are performed. First, for each time t, the 
mean value is calculated, and each individual value, Xit, is compared against the obtained 
average value of: 
hit= 𝑋𝑖𝑡∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡Ni=1
N
          (2) 
A panel of  {ℎ𝑖𝑡} is formed from ℎ𝑖𝑡 for all 50 states and years from 1997 to 2017 from Equation 
(2) with the elimination of the initial 𝑋it. 
The second step involves the variance of the hit values for each time t with the variance 
being calculated from the following formula: 
 Ht= ∑ (hit-1)Ni=1 2N           (3) 
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The reason for comparing each hit value to 1 is that if there is convergence, all these values 
should converge to 1, which are the transition curves. 
In order to specify the null hypothesis of convergence, PS (2007) formulate the 
idiosyncratic element 𝜑𝑖𝑡 as: 
 𝜑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖 + 𝜎𝑖𝜀𝑖𝑡𝐿(𝑡)𝑡𝛼         (4) 
where 𝜑𝑖 is fixed, 𝜎𝑖 is an idiosyncratic scale parameter, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is iid(0.1) across i, L(t) is a slowly 
varying function such as Ln(t) (L(t)→ ∞ as t→ ∞) and 𝛼 denotes the speed of convergence. 
The null hypothesis of convergence is formulated as: 
H0: 𝜑𝑖 = 𝜑 and 𝛼 ≥ 0 
against the alternative of no convergence, which is  
HA: 𝜑𝑖 ≠ 𝜑 for all i or 𝛼 < 0. 
 The absolute convergence hypothesis is based on the fact that 𝐻𝑡 tends to zero. To test 
for absolute convergence, the following model is used: 
 Ln (H1Ht )  -2Ln( Ln (t) )=a+β Ln (t) +ut, where   t=[𝑟𝑇], [𝑟𝑇] +1,…,T.  (5) 
Based on Monte Carlo simulations provided by PS (2007), it is suggested that r = 0.30 for 
sample sizes below T = 50. If β<0, then the absolute convergence hypothesis, i.e. σ-
convergence is rejected and the next step is to proceed to testing for conditional convergence, 
specifically club convergence using the value obtained for β.  
To test for club convergence, i.e. β-convergence, an iterative algorithm developed by 
PS (2007) is applied and tested at the 95% significance level, which they refer to as the log t 
test.  The iterative procedure to identify convergence clubs is summarized in four steps: 
(i.) The panel data is ordered from the highest to lowest based on the observations 
of the last period.  
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(ii.) The next step is to select k in the panel states to form each club, where k is the 
number of members of each club. This begins to form groups of states. i.e. clubs 
from the highest value of each variable in the last period, so that the clubs could 
contain anywhere from 2 ≤ k < N members, where the size of the club is 
determined based on the estimated t-statistic of the estimated coefficient of 
Ln(t), which is β  from Equation (5). As long as the estimated t-statistic is > 
-1.65, the state is counted in the club.   
(iii.) If, in the previous step, two states meet the established criterion, the process will 
continue to add states in the order as they appear in the data panel, which is 
already sorted.  As long as the data continues to meet the criterion, the state is 
added to the club. When the data no longer meets the criterion, the first club is 
formed and completed.  
(iv.) The fourth and last step for the remaining states is to iteratively apply Steps (i.) 
to (iii.) in order to find successive clubs. The states show divergent behavior if 
no core group can be found. 
Phillips and Sul (2007) also propose modeling the transitional elements 𝜑it by building 
a relative measure based on the average value provided in Equation (2):    hit= 𝑋𝑖𝑡∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡Ni=1
N
= 𝜑𝑖𝑡∑ 𝜑𝑖𝑡Ni=1
N
.          (6) 
This measures the weighted coefficients, 𝜑it in relation to the panel data so that the variable ℎ𝑖𝑡 
is called the relative transition path. It traces an individual path for each state i relative to the 
average of the panel data. Thus, ℎ𝑖𝑡 measures the trajectory of each state i from the starting 
position relative to the path of common growth. When there is common behavior in the path of 
growth between regions, ℎ𝑖𝑡= ℎ𝑡, a convergence club between that group is formed and, in the 
same way, a path of common growth for the club in the panel data can be traced. 
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Studying convergence in a panel data set has several appealing features. Since the 
model traces an individual path for each region i relative to the average panel of data, we can 
distinguish, empirically, different degrees of convergence. The regression coefficient, β 
provides a scaled estimator of the speed of convergence, parameter α, specifically, 𝛽 = 2𝛼.1  
2. Data and Empirical Results  
 In this paper, by dividing real SDP by the population permits a comparison of real SDP 
across states without having the size of the population skew the findings. To test for club 
convergence in all 50 states of the U.S., real SDP per capita in chained 2009 dollars from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is used from 1997 to 2017. A list of all 50 states is 
provided in Table 1 along with the real SDP per capita for 1997 and 2017.  
FIGURE 1 
 Per Capita Real Income Growth between 1997 and 2017 
 
 
Figure 1 shows a dispersion diagram of the natural log of real SDP per capita in 1997 against 
log real SDP per capita in 2017 for the 50 states. The distance between the 45-degree line and 
each data point reflects the average growth rate for 20 years for each state.  All the states, 
except for Nevada, are above the 45-degree line, which indicates that the states have been, 
                                                 
1Please see Appendix B in PS (2007). 
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overall, quite successful during the last two decades with 49 states having experienced an 
increase in real SDP per person on average. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of cross-sectional real income dispersion over time in 
what illustrates the notion of σ-convergence, which is the Pearson coefficient of variation.  The 
Pearson coefficient of variation is used as a measure of convergence in the sense that it 
describes the overall movement of the data in the panel.  If the Pearson coefficient of variation 
increases, this indicates that the dispersion in the data increases and the reverse also holds.  
The graph of the Pearson coefficient of variation in Figure 2 shows that dispersion 
increases around the Dot.com recession of 2001 and The Great Financial Crisis of 2007 and 
decreases once these crises are overcome. The polynomial regression trend line smooths out 
the Pearson coefficient of variation in order to capture the overall trend.  
 When the iterative log t test is applied to per capita real SDP across all 50 states, the 
hypothesis of overall convergence is strongly rejected at the 5% significance level since the 
value of the estimated t-stat. is -10.3433, which is less than the critical value of -1.65. 
Therefore, absolute convergence is rejected at the 95% significance level for the U.S.  
The next step is to proceed to check for the clustering using the PS (2007) Club 
Convergence Model. In the U.S., this paper has found there to be two clubs with no divergent 
states being identified.  
The first convergence club contains twenty-eight states; they are the states with the 
highest per capita real SDP with an average of $55,399 in 2017 as is shown in Table 2. For the 
first club, the estimated β coefficient is -0.2226 and the estimated t-statistic is -1.3618. The 
estimated β coefficient provides the speed of convergence, which is not fast for Club 1 as 
indicated by the negative sign of the estimated β coefficient.  Since the estimated β coefficient 
is statistically significant at the 95% significance level, it meets the club convergence criterion 
of PS (2007).  
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TABLE 1 
Real SDP per Capita across U.S. States (in Chained 2009 Dollars) from the BEA 
States 1997 2017 
Alabama 31,398   37,508   
Alaska 61,797   63,610   
Arizona 34,434   39,583   
Arkansas 30,435   36,714   
California 41,345   60,359   
Colorado 43,558   54,026   
Connecticut 54,740   62,633   
Delaware 57,306   63,955   
Florida 35,372   39,842   
Georgia 40,873   45,925   
Hawaii 43,832   52,869   
Idaho 28,780   36,441   
Illinois 45,435   55,102   
Indiana 37,285   46,427   
Iowa 37,319   52,284   
Kansas 37,497   47,435   
Kentucky 35,264   39,277   
Louisiana 40,733   44,372   
Maine 32,967   39,521   
Maryland 41,966   56,375   
Massachusetts 47,182   66,500   
Michigan 39,408   44,201   
Minnesota 42,631   54,805   
Mississippi 28,265   32,447   
Missouri 39,677   43,036   
Montana 29,984   39,833   
Nebraska 39,369   54,654   
Nevada 48,066   44,812   
New Hampshire 39,557   52,509   
New Jersey 49,643   56,776   
New Mexico 36,297   41,619   
New York 49,045   65,220   
North Carolina 39,330   44,706   
North Dakota 31,785   64,911   
Ohio 39,635   48,188   
Oklahoma 32,588   44,535   
Oregon 33,967   51,312   
Pennsylvania 38,759   51,841   
Rhode Island 38,025   48,314   
South Carolina 34,069   37,637   
South Dakota 30,784   48,004   
Tennessee 36,910   44,348   
Texas 41,366   53,737   
Utah 35,533   45,493   
Vermont 32,725   44,831   
Virginia 43,069   52,124   
Washington 45,753   59,333   
West Virginia 30,445   37,353   
Wisconsin 38,663   48,666   
Wyoming 46,585   61,091   
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FIGURE 2 
Dispersion of Real SDP per Capita between 1997 and 2017 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Convergence Clubs Classification of U.S. 
  States "β"   Coefficient t Statistic 
Per capita 
SDP (2017) 
 
All states in the sample -0.8935 -10.3433 
 
Club 1 Massachusetts, New York, North 
Dakota, Delaware, Alaska, 
Connecticut, Wyoming, California, 
Washington, New Jersey, Maryland, 
Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Colorado, Texas, Hawaii,  New 
Hampshire,  Iowa, Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, Oregon, Wisconsin, 
Rhode Island, Ohio, South Dakota, 
Kansas, Oklahoma 
-0.2226 -1.3618 55,399 
Club 2 Indiana, Georgia, Utah, Vermont, 
Nevada, North Carolina, Louisiana, 
Tennessee, Michigan, Missouri, New 
Mexico, Florida, Montana, Arizona, 
Maine, Kentucky, South Carolina, 
Alabama, West Virginia, Arkansas, 
Idaho, Mississippi 
-0.0470 -0.4292 41,178 
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The second convergence club includes twenty-two states, which has an average of 
$41,178 per capita real SDP in 2017 as is shown in Table 2. This is also a weakly cohesive 
club as indicated by the estimated β coefficient is -0.0470 and the estimated t-statistic is -
0.4292. As it is with Club 1, the speed of convergence for Club 2 is slow as indicated by the 
negative sign of the estimated β coefficient, but it is statistically significant at the 95% 
significance level.  Therefore, it meets the log t test convergence criterion.  The convergence 
for Club 2 is seen as stronger than Club 1 since the results of the log t test are further away 
from the critical value of -1.65, when compared to the estimated t-statistic of Club 1. 
Figure 3 is a map of the U.S., which shows the member states of Club 1 and Club 2. 
Figure 4 illustrates the relative transition paths of the two clubs, which are calculated as the 
cross-sectional mean of the members of each club using Equation (6). The transition paths 
show that Club 1 and Club 2 are diverging away from each other across the sample period of 
1997 to 2017.  The transition path for Club 1 is above one, which indicates that it is above 
average and Club 2 is below average since its transition path is less than unity.  
FIGURE 3 
Map of Convergence Clubs in the U.S. 
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FIGURE 4 
Transition Paths of Convergence Clubs in the U.S. 
 
 
After having established the existence of 2 clubs in the U.S. from 1997 to 2017, the 
tendencies across clubs are explored. Following Bartkowska and Riedl (2012), the log t test for 
the lower-income members in Club 1 are tested against the higher-income members in Club 2 
in order to see if these member states also meet the criterion of club convergence according to 
PS (2007).   
It is possible for the members of each club to transition to the other club in the future 
with the boundary member states having the highest capability of switching clubs. There are 
important policy implications regarding the identification of member states that have the 
capability of switching clubs.  
The log t test finds that 36% of the lower-income members in Club 1 and 40% of the 
higher-income members in Club 2 have the potential of switching clubs at a future time. This 
could indicate that some of the states that belong to different clubs could converge to each other 
over time, but also, that the borders between the clubs are somewhat diffuse. Therefore, some 
states could be in transition to a higher or lower club. Similar findings are found by Bartkowska 
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and Riedl (2012) for 206 European regions between 1990 and 2002 and by PS (2009) for 152 
countries between 1970 and 2003.    
From Club 1, nine states have the potential of transitioning to Club 2, which are 
Virginia, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Wisconsin, Rhode Island, Ohio, South Dakota, Kansas, and 
Oklahoma. Ten states from Club 2 have the potential of switching to Club 1 and these states 
are Indiana, Georgia, Utah, Vermont, Nevada, North Carolina, Louisiana, Tennessee, Michigan 
and Missouri. The other states not mentioned definitely belong in their respective clubs and 
they do not appear to have the potential to switch clubs at the moment.  
In terms of their growth paths, the two convergence clubs follow the pattern of the flow 
of funds from the federal government to the 50 states, which DiNapoli (2017, 2018) provides 
in nominal per capita SDP terms for 2016 and 2017. Table 3 provides a list of states by 
convergence clubs and it shows the ranking of states according to the surplus or deficit of each 
state in 2017 along with the amount of the surplus or deficit as provided by DiNapoli (2018).  
If a state runs a deficit, this means that for each $1 the state gives to the federal government, 
the state receives less than $1 back in funds from the federal government. The states, that get 
back more from the federal government than what they give to the federal government, are 
classified as a surplus. 
Surpluses are classified into four categories as is shown in Table 4. Since the 
convergence clubs are classified as Club 1 and Club 2, each surplus/deficit designation is 
assigned a letter in order to help with the processing of the information. As is shown in Table 
4, there are 17 states that have a per capita surplus of $4,001 or more is denoted as “A”. 10 
states have a per capita surplus from $2,001 to $4,000 and is denoted as “B”, 12 states have a 
per capita surplus from $0 to $2,100 and 11 states have deficits and are donor states, which are 
denoted as “C” and “D,” respectively.  
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TABLE 3 
List of States by Convergence Clubs and by Surpluses or Deficits 
State Abb. 
Club 
Conv 
Rank of 
Surplus/Deficit 
State Surplus or Deficit Surplus or Deficit Amount 
Virginia VA 1 4 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Maryland MD 1 6 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Alaska AK 1 8 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Hawaii HI 1 9 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Oklahoma OK 1 14 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Rhode Island RI 1 23 B Per Capita Surplus $2,001 to $4,000 
Pennsylvania PA 1 24 B Per Capita Surplus $2,001 to $4,000 
Ohio OH 1 25 B Per Capita Surplus $2,001 to $4,000 
Oregon OR 1 28 C Per Capita Surplus $0 to $2,000 
Texas TX 1 30 C Per Capita Surplus $0 to $2,000 
Kansas KS 1 31 C Per Capita Surplus $0 to $2,000 
Delaware DE 1 33 C Per Capita Surplus $0 to $2,000 
Iowa IA 1 34 C Per Capita Surplus $0 to $2,000 
Colorado CO 1 35 C Per Capita Surplus $0 to $2,000 
North Dakota ND 1 36 C Per Capita Surplus $0 to $2,000 
South Dakota SD 1 37 C Per Capita Surplus $0 to $2,000 
Wisconsin WI 1 38 C Per Capita Surplus $0 to $2,000 
Washington WA 1 39 C Per Capita Surplus $0 to $2,000 
Nebraska NE 1 41 D Per Capita Deficit-Subsidizes Other States 
Wyoming WY 1 42 D Per Capita Deficit-Subsidizes Other States 
California CA 1 43 D Per Capita Deficit-Subsidizes Other States 
New Hampshire NH 1 44 D Per Capita Deficit-Subsidizes Other States 
Minnesota MN 1 45 D Per Capita Deficit-Subsidizes Other States 
Illinois IL 1 46 D Per Capita Deficit-Subsidizes Other States 
New York NY 1 47 D Per Capita Deficit-Subsidizes Other States 
Connecticut CT 1 48 D Per Capita Deficit-Subsidizes Other States 
Massachusetts MA 1 49 D Per Capita Deficit-Subsidizes Other States 
New Jersey NJ 1 50 D Per Capita Deficit-Subsidizes Other States 
New Mexico NM 2 1 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
West Virginia WV 2 2 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Mississippi MS 2 3 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Alabama AL 2 5 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Maine ME 2 7 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Kentucky KY 2 10 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
South Carolina SC 2 11 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Louisiana LA 2 12 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Arizona AZ 2 13 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Arkansas AR 2 15 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Montana MT 2 16 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Vermont VT 2 17 A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 
Idaho ID 2 18 B Per Capita Surplus $2,001 to $4,000 
Missouri MO 2 19 B Per Capita Surplus $2,001 to $4,000 
Tennessee TN 2 20 B Per Capita Surplus $2,001 to $4,000 
North Carolina NC 2 21 B Per Capita Surplus $2,001 to $4,000 
Florida FL 2 22 B Per Capita Surplus $2,001 to $4,000 
Georgia GA 2 26 B Per Capita Surplus $2,001 to $4,000 
Michigan MI 2 27 B Per Capita Surplus $2,001 to $4,000 
Indiana IN 2 29 C Per Capita Surplus $0 to $2,000 
Nevada NV 2 32 C Per Capita Surplus $0 to $2,000 
Utah UT 2 40 D Per Capita Deficit--Subsidizes Other States 
TABLE 4 
List of Surplus or Deficit Received by States 
Surplus/Deficit Code Surplus/Deficit Amount Number of States 
A Per Capita Surplus of $4,001 or more 17 
B Per Capita Surplus $2,001 to $4,000 10 
C Per Capita Surplus $0 to $2,000 12 
D Per Capita Deficit-Subsidizes Other States  11 
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The ranking of donor states, as provided by DiNapoli (2018) is from 1 to 50 with the 
first state having the highest surplus, which is New Mexico, and the state with the largest deficit 
is the fiftieth state, which is New Jersey. Hence, New Mexico receives the most money back 
from the federal government and therefore has the largest surplus. Alternatively, New Jersey 
is the state that receives the least back from the federal government and thus, has the largest 
deficit.   
Club 1 contains all 10 out of 11 states that have per capita deficits, which are Nebraska, 
Wyoming, California, New Hampshire, Minnesota, Illinois, New York, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, and New Jersey, which are ranked as the 41st to the 50th donor states.  
Utah is the only state that is a deficit state, which is in Club 2, but the deficit is close to 
$0.  It is ranked as the 40th donor state in 2017. In 2016, Utah has a rank of 37 and it has 
received a surplus that ranges from $0 to $2,000 (DiNapoli 2017, 2018).  Utah is also one of 
the higher income states in Club 2 that has a chance of transitioning to Club 1.  
In Club 1, there are 18 states that have per capita surpluses. Nine of these states, which 
are Virginia, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Wisconsin, Rhode Island, Ohio, South Dakota, Kansas, 
and Oklahoma, are at the lower end of Club 1, but they are at risk of slipping into the lower 
club, i.e. Club 2 if their growth does not continue as projected.  
Maryland, Alaska, and Hawaii are in Club 1 and they have received per capita surpluses 
of more than $4,001 but they also have relatively high real SDP per capita in 2017.  Maryland, 
Alaska, and Hawaii are in the top 20 when ranking the real SDP per capita from the highest to 
the lowest in 2017 with Alaska being fifth, Maryland being twelfth, and Hawaii being 
seventeenth. This indicates, that based on club convergence and real SDP per capita in 2017, 
Maryland, Alaska, and Hawaii are firmly ensconced in Club 1. Texas, Delaware, Iowa, 
Colorado, North Dakota, and Washington also receive per capita surpluses that ranges from $0 
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to $2,000 but their real SDP per capita are also in the 20 highest of all 50 states, which firmly 
puts them in Club 1.    
In Club 2, there are 12 states that have per capita surpluses of more than $4,001, 7 states 
with per capital surpluses of $2,001 to $4,000, 2 states with per capital surpluses of $0 to $2,000 
and 1 state with a per capita deficit, which is Utah as previously has been stated.  
Indiana, Georgia, Utah, Vermont, Nevada, North Carolina, Louisiana, Tennessee, 
Michigan and Missouri have the potential of switching from Club 2 to Club 1, which is not 
surprising given that their real SDP per capita are ranked in the top thirtieth in 2017. Hence, 
with the proper aid that focuses on improving the structure of their respective economies such 
as infrastructure, technological preferences, population growth, education, financial 
systems, government policy, factor market structure, etc., they have the ability to move to 
Club 1 (Galor 1996). 
New Mexico, Florida, Montana, Arizona, Maine, Kentucky, South Carolina, 
Alabama, West Virginia, Arkansas, Idaho, and Mississippi are the remaining member states 
of Club 2 and they are firmly entrenched in Club 2.  This is understandable especially since 
their real SDP per capita in 2017 ranked at or below the fortieth level with Mississippi having 
the lowest real SDP per capita for all 50 states.  
The policy implications of the club convergence for each of states varies. The member 
states that are firmly entrenched in Club 1, which are Nebraska, Wyoming, California, New 
Hampshire, Minnesota, Illinois, New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
Maryland, Alaska, Hawaii, Texas, Delaware, Iowa, Colorado, North Dakota, and Washington, 
are doing well by being above the average since their transition paths are greater than unity. 
The states, that are running a deficit, meaning they get back less from the federal government 
than they give, indicate that their economies have a tendency of being self-sufficient barring 
some sort of large calamity.  
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In Club 1, the states that are receiving back more from the federal government than 
what they give are being spent in a manner that improves their overall infrastructure, which is 
helping these states to grow.  It is important to note that there are states at risk of slipping from 
Club 1 to Club 2, which are Virginia, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Wisconsin, Rhode Island, Ohio, 
South Dakota, Kansas, and Oklahoma. These states need to examine their infrastructure for 
weaknesses or they might need more aid to shore-up these weaknesses from becoming major 
problems down the line.  
Regarding Club 2, the member states who have the potential from moving from Club 2 
to the higher club of Club 1, which are Indiana, Georgia, Utah, Vermont, Nevada, North 
Carolina, Louisiana, Tennessee, Michigan and Missouri, might need more help with their 
infrastructure. It seems as if they are making strides but they are not strong enough to break 
into Club 1 on their own.  
The remaining states are firmly entrenched in Club 2, which are New Mexico, Florida, 
Montana, Arizona, Maine, Kentucky, South Carolina, Alabama, West Virginia, Arkansas, 
Idaho, and Mississippi. They are at risk of decline, which means that the gap between the 
firmly entrenched states in Club 2 will grow farther away from the firmly entrenched states 
in Club 1 thereby creating a socio-economic divide within the U.S., which will lead to a 
divided U.S. So, the policy remedy according to Galor (1996) is to have an income transfers 
to the states that are firmly entrenched in Club 2 by developing their infrastructure such as 
education, technological preferences, etc. It is necessary to introduce state-level policies 
that focus on technology, innovation, and human capital improvements with the aim of  
knowledge accumulation since these are essential to economic growth by increasing  
productivity (Bartkowska and Riedl 2012, Choi and Wang 2015, Von Lyncker and 
Thoennessen 2017).  
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Table 5 shows differences between Club 1 and Club 2 using the balance of payments 
in per capita terms, the growth rate of R&D as a percentage of SDP, growth in the number 
of patents, population growth, and the percentage of people with bachelor’s degrees in 
Science or Engineering.2 The surplus in the balance of payments per capita is higher in 
Club 2. So, the Club 1 members, in many instances, act as donors for the Club 2 members. 
The descriptive analysis confirms this. The members in Club 1 have on average $3,019 less 
in per capita terms, when compared to the members in Club 2 in reference to the balance 
of payments in per capita terms. Another significant difference is the gap between the 
percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree in in Science or Engineering in terms 
of education. The members in Club 1 have more people with college degrees than Club 2.  
Club 1 is 4.19% higher on average when compared to Club 2.  
TABLE 5 
Differences between Club Members by Observed Characteristics 
Variable 
Club 1 Club2 Diff. 
Mean St.Er. Mean St.Er. Mean 
Balance of Payments per Capita, 2017 1244.8 507.7 4264.2 509.9  -3019.4*** 
Growth of R&D Spending as % of SDP, 1996-2016 18.60% 7.1 7.13% 7.2 11.40% 
Growth in Number of Patents per Capita, 1995-2015 79.40% 14.2 52.10% 6.7 27.30% 
Population Growth, 1996-2017 19.30% 2.1 26.60% 4.7 -7.30% 
% of Bachelor Degree and +, 1996 21.60% 0.6 17.40% 0.6 4.19%*** 
*** significant at the 1% level, **-significant at the 5% level, *-significant at the 1% level 
 
Although the estimates are not statistically significant, Table 5 identifies the other 
important differences across the members of the two clubs. On average, the states of Club 
1 experience a 7.3 percent lower population growth in the period between 1996 and 2017. 
The growth in spending on R&D and the number of patents per capita are also lower in the 
                                                 
2
 The number of U.S. patents is obtained from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The next technological 
variable is R&D as a percentage of SDP with the data being acquired from the National Science Foundation and 
the human capital variable is the number of Bachelor’s Degrees in Science or Engineering conferred per 1,000 
individuals with the data being acquired from the National Science Board.  
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club with the lower SDP per capita, which is Club 2. For example, the number of patents 
per capita in Club 1 grows by 14.2% in the period between 1995 and 2015 while the growth 
in the counterpart club is more than twofold less. R&D spending has grown by 18.6% in 
the richer club, which is 11.4% higher than the poorer club. 
TABLE 6 
Factors Explaining the Membership in Club 1 (Logit Regression) 
Variable Coef.  Z-stat p-value 
Balance of Payments per Capita, 2017*1000 -0.0582 -3.71 0.000 
Growth of R&D Spending as % of SDP, 1996-2016*10 -0.0031 -0.48 0.634 
Growth in Number of Patents per Capita, 1995-2015*10 0.0160 0.9 0.366 
Population Growth, 1996-2017 -0.0076 -2.12 0.034 
% of Bachelor Degree, 1996 0.0616 5.25 0.000 
Reported coefficients are the marginal effects computed for the average values of the controlled 
factors. Standard errors are computed using the delta-method. 
 
The earlier analysis demonstrates that certain states are in the borderline between 
the rich and poor club. Table 6 reports the average marginal effects from the logit regression 
with Club 1 membership as the dependent variable, which is regressed on the set of controls 
from Table 6. The three most important factors that could set the transition paths for the 
clubs are the balance of payments per capita, population growth, and education.  
Specifically, the propensity of being in Club 1 is negatively affected by the surplus 
in the balance of payments. A $1,000 decrease in the balance of payments increases the 
state’s chance of become a member of Club 1 by 6% at the 95% significance level. 
Regarding the effect of the population with a bachelor’s degree in Science or Engineering, 
a 1 % increase in these degree holders increases membership in Club 1 by 6% at the 95% 
significance level. Lastly, the population growth has a relatively smaller implication on 
Club 1 membership. At the 95% significance level, a 1% increase in the population growth 
decreases the probability of being in Club 1 by 0.7%.  
The results from the logit regression shows that technological development has a 
lesser implication on the propensity of Club 1 membership with the growth in the number 
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of patents per capita being used as a proxy of technological innovation. New products or 
technologies can easily cross the state borders and positive benefits of new technologies 
are shared between the states of both clubs. The effects of the growth in R&D spending as 
a percentage of SDP and the growth in the number of patents per capita are found to be 
statistically insignificant with respect to membership in Club 1. 
4. Conclusion 
The PS econometric tools (2007) are able to capture both absolute and conditional 
convergence. When there is conditional convergence, the PS econometric tools (2007) are also 
able to specify club convergence while being able to use either stationary or non-stationary 
data and by also being able to overcome the omitted variable bias.  
 With respect to the per capita real SDP for all 50 states of the U.S., the log t test of 
PS model (2007) rejects absolute convergence at the 95% significance level and it finds two 
diverging clubs. Club 1, the high growth club contains 28 states with 9 having the ability to 
slip into the lower growth club, Club 2.  Club 2 has 22 states and 10 of the states have the 
ability to becoming part of the higher growth club, Club 1.  
It is understandable that absolute convergence is rejected for the U.S. since the 
composition of each state is different in terms of population, infrastructure, resources, etc. 
There are states in Club 1, which receive funds from the federal government and are high 
growth. Alternatively, there are low growth states that receive funds from the federal 
government and are in Club 2.   
It seems that the states with a surplus in Club 1 are using the income transfers from the 
federal government in a manner that ensures above average growth in the long-run. Twelve out 
of seventeen states that have surpluses of more than $4,001 are in Club 2 yet five out of 
seventeen have surpluses of more than $4,001 are in Club 1, the high growth club.  
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For the aforementioned states in Club 2, there are three possible scenarios or possible 
mix of scenarios with respect to their surplus, which are: (i.) the federal funds are being used 
to shore up the bottom, meaning the funds are more about the present day survival of the state; 
(ii.) the federal funds might not be enough to focus on long-term growth; or (iii.) are being used 
inefficiently.   The states with surpluses of more than $4,001 in Club 1 seem to be using the 
federal funds on infrastructure that promotes long-term economic growth.  
The factors that affect membership in Club 1 are tested using the logit regression. 
The balance of payments per capita has an inverse relationship with the probability of 
belonging to Club 1 as does population growth. The percentage of the population with a 
bachelor’s degree in Science or Engineering has a positive relationship with respect to the 
probability of being in Club 1. The growth of R&D spending as a percentage of SDP and 
the growth in the number of patents per capita are found to be statistically insignificant at 
the 95% significance level regarding the probability of Club 1 membership.  
Hence, the PS log t test (2007) is telling the tale of there being two Americas if all 
factors remain the same, but this need not be the case. A state need not necessarily be 
entrenched in any given club. With the proper aid to improve the structure of a state’s economy, 
a low growth state can become a high growth state that has a deficit instead of a surplus.  
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